This paper is an exploration of the relationships among the firm's financial structure, its choice of liquid asset holdings, and growth. We present a theoretical model of the firm where external finance is costly and where retaining earnings as liquid assets serves a precautionary motive. One of...

We study differences in the price paid for liquidity across banks using price data at the individual bank level. Unique to this paper, we also have data on individual banks' reserve requirements and actual reserve holdings, thus allowing us to gauge the extent to which a bank is short or long...

This paper develops a theory of multiple unit auctions with short squeezes in the post- auction market. This is especially relevant for financial and commodity markets where players may enter the auction with established forward positions. We study how a potential short squeeze impacts on...

We study uniform price auctions using a dataset which includes individual bidders' demand schedules in Finnish Treasury auctions during the period 1992-99. Average underpricing amounts to .041% of face value. Theory suggests that underpricing may result from monopsonistic market power. We...

We study bidder bahavior and performance in 53 main refinancing operations (repo auctions) of the European Central Bank (ECB). The data set starts with the first auctions after the ECB changed from fixed rate tenders to variable rate tenders. We find that private information and the winnner's...

We study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity (captured by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap) as a function of market conditions and bank characteristics. These prices depend in particular on the distribution of liquidity...

We study differences in the price paid for liquidity across banks using price data at the individual bank level. Unique to this paper, we also have data on individual banks' reserve requirements and actual reserve holdings, thus allowing us to gauge the extent to which a bank is short or long...

Repo auctions are used to inject central bank funds against collateral into the banking sector. The ECB uses standard discriminatory auctions and hundreds of banks participate. The amount auctioned over the monthly reserve maintenance period is in principle exactly what banks collectively need...

We identify frictions in the market for liquidity as well as bank-specific and market-wide factors that affect the prices that banks pay for liquidity, captured here by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap. We have price data at the...

This paper presents a descriptive analysis of the primary and secondary market for Finnish treasury bonds.The paper focuses on three issues.First, we report basic descriptive statistics such as auction volumes and secondary market yields and volumes.Second, we estimate the revenues earned by...