Corrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism: double-dealing, whistle-blowing and extortion are significant uncertainties for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators may use an asymmetric design of (criminal) sanctions and leniency...

Corruption at central banks induces distorted policies by generating a tendency to increase inflation. An inflation bias arises because the public distrusts central bank's benevolence, not only its commitments. We show that distrust among the public, measured by a high level of expected...

The objectives of government are pivotal to understanding the diverse negative effects of corruption on public welfare. Corruption renders governments unable or unwilling to maximize welfare. In the first case, it distorts agents' decisions and limits the contractual space available to agents...

Die jüngsten Korruptionsskandale haben in der Öffentlichkeit das Bewusstsein dafür geschärft, dass Politiker und Beamte nicht immer der Allgemeinheit dienen, sondern für staatliche oder kommunale Aufträge sowie Steuernachlässe Bestechungsgelder (oder illegale Parteispenden) annehmen oder...

Because corruption must be hidden from the public and is not enforced by courts it entails transaction costs, which are larger than those from legal exchange. This suggests that corrupt contracts are primarily relational contracts where legal exchange serves as a basis for sealing and enforcing...