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which managers could become entrenched, they already bear a large proportion of the costs and have therefore an incentive to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297809
structure. Using GMM methodology to control for the potential endogeneity of all regressors, I find a statistically and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277921
with agency theory, we can show that the leverage level is the lowest if the founding family is simultaneously a large …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305690
The paper shows that, as owners accumulate larger stakes and hence become less risk-tolerant, their incentives to monitor management are attenuated because monitoring shifts some of the firm's risk from management to owners. This counterbalances the positive effect which more concentrated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260562
An empirical model of managers' demand for agency goods is derived and estimated using the Almost Ideal Demand System … of Deaton and Muellbauer (AER 1980). As in Jensen and Meckling (JFE 1976), we derive managers' demand for agency goods by … maximizing a managerial utility function where managers allocate the potential value of their firm's assets to the consumption of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274320
Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage …. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261074
work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281035
work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282632
This paper analyzes the determinants of the German corporate governance rating recently developed by Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004). We find a non- linear relationship between ownership concentration and the quality of firmlevel corporate governance as measured by the rating. Firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390584
This study provides new stylized facts on the determinants of corporate failure and acquisition in Germany. It also offers important lessons for the design of empirical studies. We show that firms experiencing failure or acquisition are significantly different from surviving firms on a number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010297767