Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power...

We consider a hedonic coalition formation game in which at each possible partition any new coalition can decide the probability with which to form and leave the current partition. These probabilities are commonly known so that farsighted players can decide whether or not to support a coalition's...

A designer conducts random searches to detect criminals, and may condition the search probability on individuals' appearance. She updates her belief about the distribution of criminals across appearances using her search results, but incorrectly takes her sample distribution for the population...

Before choosing her action to match the state of the world, an agent observes a stream of messages generated by some unknown binary signal. The agent can either learn the underlying signal for free and update her belief accordingly or ignore the observed message and keep her prior belief. After...

The class of games with one apex player is generalized to the class of games with a collection of apex sets. These simple games, together with a power index, canonically induce a hedonic coalition formation game. A monotonicity property of solutions is introduced and its meaning for the induced...