Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Political campaign spending ceilings are purported to limit the incumbent's ability to exploit his fundraising advantage. If the challenger does not have superior campaign effectiveness, in contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that the incumbent always benefits from a limit as long as he has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292887
With politician preferences over policy outcomes, the effect of a contribution cap with monetary penalties for exceeding the cap is starkly different from the case with an indifferent politician. In contrast to Kaplan and Wettstein (AER, 2006) and Gale and Che (AER, 2006), a cap is never neutral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292901
This paper completes Meirowitz (2008) by analyzing the effect of a cap on political campaign spending in an environment where voters have initial preferences over political candidates. The policy implications are starkly different from the previously analyzed case where voters are indifferent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292905
This paper provides simple closed form formulae for players' expected payoffs in a broad class of all-pay contests where players may have constraints on their actions.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293652
This paper presents a simple statistical exercise to provide a benchmark for the degree of electoral stagnation without direct officeholder benefits or challenger scare-off effects. Here electoral stagnation arises solely due to incumbent-quality advantage where the higher quality candidate wins...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293676
In an observational learning environment rational agents may mimic the actions of the predecessors even when their own signal suggests the opposite. In case early movers’ signals happen to be incorrect society may settle on a common inefficient action, resulting in an inefficient informational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293773
This paper extends Che and Gale (1998) by allowing the incumbent politician to have a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed where two lobbyists contest for a political prize. The cap always helps the lobbyist whose policy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293807
We extend the Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) informational cascade framework to allow for asymmetric signal accuracy. Simulations demonstrate that even small departures from symmetry may lead to non-monotonic effects of signal accuracy on the likelihood of an inefficient cascade.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293828
Since a fixed exchange rate regime is a fixed price system, there is no theoretical reason to presume that the foreign exchange market clears, particularly during a speculative attack. This paper shows that equilibria where we allow for the possibility of such corner solutions are a superset of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011801278