To investigate the extent to which the transparency of the Bank of Canada's monetary policy has improved, the authors examine empirically - over the period 30 October 2000 to 31 May 2007 - the reaction of Canadian financial markets to official Bank communications, and in particular their...

The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better...

This paper compares the link between exchange rates and interest rates under full information and two alternative asymmetric information approaches. It also distinguishes between cases of expansionary and contractionary depreciations. Full information results are not robust to the presence of...

Using a unique intervention news data set, this paper investigates the impact of ECB intervention and intervention-related news (newswire reports) on the euro exchange rate. A time-series study of news generated by ECB officials and market participants regarding intervention and the value of the...

How do financial markets price new information? This paper analyzes price setting at the intersection of private and public information, by testing whether and how the reaction of financial markets to public signals depends on the relative importance of private information in agents’...

This paper uses Latent Semantic Analysis to extract information from Bank of Canada communication statements and investigates what type of information affects returns and volatility in short-term as well as long-term interest rate markets over the 2002-2008 period. Discussions about geopolitical...

In a market environment with random detection of product quality, a firm can employ umbrella branding as a strategy to convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality of one or both of its products. We characterize...

We propose a signaling model in which the central bank and firms receive information on cost-push shocks independently from each other. If the firms’ signals are rather unlikely to be informative, central banks should remain silent about their own private signals. If, however, firms are...