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Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: An experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029781

Constrained school choice: An experimental study

Haeringer, Guillaume; Calsamiglia, Caterina; Klijn, Flip - 2009

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279488

Networks with group counterproposals

Nieva, Ricardo - 2008

sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279529

Transparent matching mechanisms

Möller, Markus - 2024

efficiency only if they are dictatorial. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536335

How to talk to multiple audiences

Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory - 2008

We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that whenever the sender can communicate informatively with both receivers by sending private messages, she can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291984

First-mover disadvantage

Mylovanov, Tymofiy - 2005

This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333947

The Coase conjecture with incomplete information on the monopolist's commitment

Kim, KyungMin - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 1, pp. 17-44

A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599414

Optimal deadlines for agreements

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599465

Contract design with limited commitment

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2018

We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946258

Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: Gamification and the Coase Theorem

Daske, Thomas - 2020

This study explores mechanism design for networks of interpersonal relationships. Agents' social (more or less altruistic or spiteful) preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. Remarkably, the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012251401

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