Similar Search Results

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players: An experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029781

Constrained school choice: An experimental study

Haeringer, Guillaume; Calsamiglia, Caterina; Klijn, Flip - 2009

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279488

Networks with group counterproposals

Nieva, Ricardo - 2008

sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279529

Transparent matching mechanisms

Möller, Markus - 2024

efficiency only if they are dictatorial. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536335

Efficient Incentives with Social Preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - 2022

This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013353396

Simple Sequencing Problems with Interdependent Costs

Mitra, Manipushpak; Hain, Roland - 2001

In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317646

Incomplete Information and Multiple Machine Queueing Problems

Mitra, Manipushpak - 2001

mechanism that extracts the private information and achieves efficiency with a transfer scheme that adds up to zero in every …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317674

Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2002

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of uninformed buyers and a finite number of sellers, some of them informed. When there is only one seller, full information revelation never...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318890

Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading

Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2004

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261280

How to talk to multiple audiences

Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory - 2008

We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that whenever the sender can communicate informatively with both receivers by sending private messages, she can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291984