The paper deals with existence and properties of temporary migration equilibria with an overlapping generations structure in a two-country-world. Individuals are living for two periods. As a young individual they are supposed to be incompletely informed about wage rates and the quality of life...

In der vorliegenden Arbeit wurde das Verhalten des Migrations-Gittins-Index, welcher im sequentiellen Migrationsmodell die optimale Migrations-"Politik" determiniert, und variierendem Risiko untersucht. Das Hauptinteresse lag auf der Frage, inwieweit sich das für risiko-neutrale Migranten...

This paper provides the first step of a planned econometric analysis of the factors influencing the remigration decisions of Turkish guest-workers in the FRG back to their home-land: the specification of a decisiontheoretically founded sequential discrete-choice model. At this it is presupposed...

Starting from a sequential decision of international migration under incomplete information (see (1)) a Markov process for the number of in- and out-migrants from country j to country o is modeled. The parameters of this process involve the degree of uncertainty of the migrants about the quality...

In a duopoly market, aspiration levels express how much sellers want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We augment the sellers' decision task by eliciting their profit aspiration. In a first experimental phase, whenever satisficing is not possible, sales choices, point...

Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 games used by Selten and Chmura (2008) and in the comment by Brunner, Camerer and Goeree (2009). Every participant played against four neighbors and could choose a different...

Most models of labor markets and (un)employment neglect how competition among firms or sectors of the economy affects their hiring of workers and working times. Our approach pays special attention to such effects by proposing a complex stage game where firms invest in capital equipment before...

We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture....