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Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

de Groot Ruiz, Adrian; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2011

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information … by an experiment. Finally, we show how partial information transmission can lead to communication failure, and show how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325901

Communication and Reputation in Procurement Auctions – Some Empirical Evidence

Heinrich, Timo - 2011

This paper studies the role of communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement … auctions. Not only positive reputation ratings but also engaging in communication increases a bidder's probability of winning …Diese Studie analysiert die Einflüsse von Kommunikation und Reputation auf Märkten mit Hilfe von Daten aus Online …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285498

Side-Effects of campaign finance reform

Dahm, Matthias; Porteiro, Nicolás - 2005

Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to 'buy favors', this paper assumes that contributions influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest groups...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266255

Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions

Hodler, Roland; Loertscher, Simon; Rohner, Dominic - 2010

Decision makers lacking crucial specialist know-how often consult with better informed but biased experts. In our model …, and to situations with multiple experts and uncertainty about the size of the expert's bias. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430094

Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information

Hahn, Volker - 2010

We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by … career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold … phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753200

Starting small to communicate

Atakan, Alp; Koçkesen, Levent; Kubilay, Elif - 2018

We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012060207

Optimal delegation of sequential decisions: The role of communication and reputation

Atakan, Alp; Koçkesen, Levent; Kubilay, Elif - 2017

gradually builds up her reputation. Principal provides full information in every period as long as he has always observed his …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696314

Can more information facilitate communication?

Ishida, Junichiro; Shimizu, Takashi - 2012

In this paper we analyze a cheap talk model with a partially informed receiver. In clear contrast to the previous literature, we find that there is a case where the receiver's prior knowledge enhances the amount of information conveyed via cheap talk. The point of departure is our explicit focus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332501

Long persuasion games

Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric - 2006

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273734

The effect of signalling and beliefs on the voluntary provision of public goods

Berlemann, Michael - 2003

suggest that this effect is due to attempts at restoring the announcements' reputation in the aftermath of heavy cheating. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305450

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