This paper provides an empirical analysis of GovernmentsÕ decisions to sell privatised companies on both international and domestic markets in a sample of 392 privatisations in 42 countries in the 1977-1998 period. Political theories of privatisation find strong support in our analyses: market...

We develop a theory and empirical test of how the legal system affects the relationship between a venture investor and an entrepreneur. The theory uses a double moral hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the quality of the legal system. The empirical...

Bei der Suche nach etwas mehr Rendite in Zeiten niedriger Zinsen wenden sich Kleinanleger verstärkt hin zum Crowdfunding. Doch Ertrag und Risiko sind auch im Crowdfunding sowie bei allen anderen Finanzgeschäften strikt positiv miteinander korreliert. Das heißt, der Investor kann durch...

We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to...

This paper outlines the foundations of corporate governance. The discussion includes a review on the modern corporation, transaction costs theory, agency costs theory, legal investor protection, investor protection by corporate governance and its various mechanisms, as well as an overview of the...

We consider a mean-variance general equilibrium economy where the expected returns for controlling and non-controlling shareholders are different because the former are able to divert a fraction of the profits. We find that when investor protection is poor, asset return correlation affects...

We empirically analyze the determinants of Initial Public Offering (IPO) underpricing using panel data for 29 countries over the period 1988-2005. Our hypotheses stress the importance of institutional and legal factors in explaining cross-country variations. We find that increased protection of...

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their...

Different investor classes are endowed with different rights, and conflicting interests among them can make protections afforded to one party detrimental to another. Indeed, we find that investor protection laws have sizeable 'cross' effects on foreign portfolio investment and the direction of...

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their...