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The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2004

of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325448

Optimal Bunching without Optimal Control

Nöldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - 2006

This paper presents simple su±cient conditions under which optimal bunches in adverse-selection principal-agent problems can be characterized without using optimal control theory.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390605

Measuring the Power of Nodes in Digraphs

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2001

Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterativemethods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed inthe literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both thenumber of its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325076

"The Gamblers Ruin" und die kritische Wahrscheinlichkeit. Geeignete Risikomaße bei Anlagen zur Alterssicherung?

Scholtz, Hellmut D. - In: Die Rentenversicherung 43 (2002) 11, pp. 201-208

Ein wesentliches Ergebnis der Untersuchung ist, dass eine Analgestrategie mit Ertragswahrscheinlichkeiten kleiner als eine "kritische Wahrscheinlichkeit" eine latente Ruinwahrscheinlichkeit beinhaltet. Diese Wahrscheinlichkeit kann aus einem definierten Gewinn-/Verlustverhältnis einfach...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330037

Decarbonization of Power Markets under Stability and Fairness: Do They Influence Efficiency?

Weissbart, Christoph - 2018

Market integration is seen as a complementary measure to decarbonize energy markets. In the context of power markets, this translates into regions that coordinate to maximize welfare in the power market with respect to a climate target. Yet, the maximization of overall welfare through...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011956673

Climate change sustainability: From bargaining to cooperative balanced approach

Ciano, Tiziana; Ferrara, Massimiliano; Gangemi, Mariangela - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-13

This work aims to provide different perspectives on the relationships between cooperative game theory and the research field concerning climate change dynamics. New results are obtained in the framework of competitive bargaining solutions and related issues, moving from a cooperative approach to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200107

Super-Additive Cooperation

Efferson, Charles; Bernhard, Helen; Fischbacher, Urs; … - 2022

Repeated interactions provide a prominent but paradoxical hypothesis for human cooperation in one-shot interactions. Intergroup competitions provide a different hypothesis that is intuitively appealing but heterodox. We show that neither mechanism reliably supports the evolution of cooperation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014290043

Should law keep pace with society? Relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods

Roithmayr, Daria; Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 124-149

Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709843

Valuating Payoff Streams under Unequal Discount Factors

Salonen, Hannu; Vartiainen, Hannu - 2007

We study repeated prize allocation problem when the discount factors f the agents are not equal. It is shown that the feasible set of payoffs is not well behaved. In particular, it is not convex as it contains holes and caves. The Pareto frontier is everywhere discontinuous and there is an open...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012502970

Axioms for Centrality Scoring with Principal Eigenvectors

Kitti, Mitri - 2012

Techniques based on using principal eigenvectors of matrices representing binary relations of sets of alternatives are commonly used in social sciences, bibliometrics, and web search engines. In most applications the binary relations can be represented by a directed graph and the question of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503033

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