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We report evidence from an experiment where a principal chooses an agent out of two to perform a task for a fixed compensation. The principal's payoff depends on the agent's ex-ante ability and on a non-contractible effort that the agent has to exert once employed. We find that a significant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291826
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide some justifications by sending a costly message. Indeed, it is optimal for the principal to explain her evaluation to the agent if and only if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323871
This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic … mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when … he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281512
in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281805
optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF … agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281823
in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282221
optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF … agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264578
optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF … agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269064
This paper provides a selective review of the theoretical literature on delegated portfolio management as a principal-agent relationship. The main focus of the paper is to review the analytical issues raised by the peculiar nature of the delegated portfolio management relationship within the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604566
Employers structure pay and employment relationships to mitigate agency problems. A large literature in economics … agency in employment relationships relies on highly stylized assumptions regarding human motivation, e.g., that employees … behavioral complexity and realism into models of agency within organizations. Specifically, we assess the insights gained by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272684