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The framing of games and the psychology of strategic choice
Dufwenberg, Martin; Gächter, Simon; Henning-Schmidt, Heike - 2006
guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263175
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The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play
Dufwenberg, Martin; Gächter, Simon; Henning-Schmidt, Heike - 2008
reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265677
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Mechanism design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282463
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Rotten kids with bad intentions
Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - 2010
player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315514
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Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2012
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316927
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Mechanism design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2016
information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises … an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social … agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522109
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Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game
Balafoutas, Loukas - 2009
This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who is averse to letting the public down. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294786
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Lying, spying, sabotaging: Procedures and consequences
Chlaß, Nadine; Riener, Gerhard - 2015
We study individuals who can choose how to compete with an opponent for one nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they spy, sabotage or fabricate their opponent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011341044
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Lying, spying, sabotaging: Procedures and consequences
Chlaß, Nadine; Riener, Gerhard - 2015
Do individuals prefer to compete fairly, or unfairly with an opponent? We study individuals who can choose how to compete for one ex-post nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419476
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A theory of sequential group reciprocity
Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro T.; Mosiño, Alejandro - In: Latin American Economic Review 26 (2017) 1, pp. 1-19
Games that appear to be independent, involving none of the same players, may be related by emotions of reciprocity … Kirchsteiger's model of sequential reciprocity (Games Econ Behav 47(2):268-298, 2004) to groups of individuals and define a new … 'sequential group reciprocity equilibrium' for which we prove its existence. We study the case of two games with two players in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994324