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Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - 2010

player has higher material payoffs, so that reciprocity does not increase equity: For sufficiently strong reciprocity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315514

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2012

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316927

The framing of games and the psychology of strategic choice

Dufwenberg, Martin; Gächter, Simon; Henning-Schmidt, Heike - 2006

guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263175

The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play

Dufwenberg, Martin; Gächter, Simon; Henning-Schmidt, Heike - 2008

reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265677

Mechanism design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011282463

Mechanism design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2016

information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises … an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social … agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522109

Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game

Balafoutas, Loukas - 2009

This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat, who is averse to letting the public down. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294786

Pro Bono Work and Trust in Expert Fields

Ong, David; Yang, Chun-Lei - 2014

A controversy has been simmering in law for at least 30 years about whether pro bono work should be mandatory for lawyers, who now donate 1-3% of their time to the poor. This has centered on the unmet legal needs of the poor, the duty of lawyers, and the contrast with US doctors, who are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398637

Frustration and Anger in Games

Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Dufwenberg, Martin; Smith, Alec - 2015

Frustration, anger, and aggression have important consequences for economic and social behavior, concerning for example monopoly pricing, contracting, bargaining, traffic safety, violence, and politics. Drawing on insights from psychology, we develop a formal approach to exploring how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500414

Lying, spying, sabotaging: Procedures and consequences

Chlaß, Nadine; Riener, Gerhard - 2015

We study individuals who can choose how to compete with an opponent for one nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they spy, sabotage or fabricate their opponent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011341044