coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a … provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of the restricted games corresponding to a class of games with …

distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a … computing the nucleolus of every restricted game corresponding to some disjunctive non-negative additive game with an acyclic …

with indicators like the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus. The core measures the extent of the synergy, the … Shapley value indicates an actor's strength to lead to and create synergy and the nucleolus determines an actor's strength to … their level of development. The study shows that state intervention in the economy influences the position of the core on a …

rationing we give a proof to Aumann and Maschlers theorem i.e. the consistent solution of a bankruptcy problem is the nucleolus … proof is not just simple and demonstrative but also provides an insight how the nucleolus is constructed in such games. …

This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen … that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for … associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any zero-normalized balanced game, the 1-nucleolus coincides with the Aumann …

in Baltic Sea. The characteristic func-tion is constructed and the Shapley value and the nucleolus are used as one …

nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. …

theoretical knowledge we present and compare seven properties of fair profit sharing. Findings: We show that the nucleolus is a … core-solution, which does not fulfil aggregate monotonicity. In contrast the Shapley value is an aggregate monotonic … solution but does not belong to the core of every cooperative game. Moreover, we present the Lorenz dominance as an additional …