We propose an equilibrium framework within which to price financial securities written on non- tradable underlyings such as temperature indices. We analyze a financial market with a finite set of agents whose preferences are described by a convex dynamic risk measure generated by the solution of...

We consider fundamental questions of arbitrage pricing arising when the uncertainty model is given by a set of possible mutually singular probability measures. With a single probability model, essential equivalence between the absence of arbitrage and the existence of an equivalent martingale...

We provide results on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in dynamically incomplete financial markets in discrete time. Our framework allows for heterogeneous agents, unspanned random endowments and convex trading constraints. In the special case where all agents have preferences of the...

We consider a full equilibrium model in continuous time comprising a finite number of agents and tradable securities.We show that, if the agents' endowments are spanned by the securities and if the agents have entropic utilities, an equilibrium exists and the agents' optimal trading strategies...

We investigate the entry timing and location decisions under market-size uncertainty with Brownian motions in a continuous-time spatial competition duopoly model a la d'Aspremont et al. (1979). Under a sequential equilibrium, the threshold of the follower non-monotonically increases in...

We examine the notion of the core when cooperation takes place in a setting with time and uncertainty. We do so in a two-period general equilibrium setting with incomplete markets. Market incompleteness implies that players cannot make all possible binding commitments regarding their actions at...

We study a Hotelling framework in which customers first pay a monopoly platform to enter the market before deciding between two competing services on opposite ends of a Hotelling line. This setup is common when modeling competition in Internet content provision. We find that standard...