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In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012664389
In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept … that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two-sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to … stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully substitutable and satisfy the Laws of Aggregate Supply and Demand. In the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189046
stability for the intermediate model. Dynamics are also discussed. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011650320
We study the formation of networks in environments where agents derive benefits from other agents directly linked to them but suffer losses through contagion when any agent on a path connected to them is hit by a shock. We first consider networks with undirected links (e.g. epidemics,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011816753
architectures that cannot prevent free-riding in public good network games. Finally, we show that aggregation enhances the stability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011943088
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272547
This paper studies the properties of convexity (concavity) and strategic complements (substitutes) in network formation and the implications for the structure of pairwise stable networks. First, different definitions of convexity (concavity) in own links from the literature are put into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272600
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279423
In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in large network games with linear best replies. Breaking up large networks into smaller subnetworks, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013396062
-players involved, there is the question of stability. We introduce and characterize a notion of marginal equilibrium, where all nodes … about node-players' information and is necessary for Nash equilibrium and for pairwise stability. Second, efficient networks … in absolute terms are characterized. Efficiency and stability are shown to be incompatible, but partial subsidizing is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496075