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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Mechanism Design Approach
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2014
investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individual rational, equilibrium selecting, and … domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208691
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Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2015
rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant … he currently is occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting …. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208721
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Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - 2020
. We prove that the only mechanism that satisfies these conditions is a price mechanism with a minimal equilibrium price …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208891
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Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities
Takamiya, Koji - 2006
solution is a strong core selection. Given this fact, this paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation … equilibrium outcomes coincides with the strong core. This generalizes one of the results by Shin and Suh (1996) obtained in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332338
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Robust stability in matching markets
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599445
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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Ünver, M. Utku; Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; … - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1, pp. 253-277
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599511
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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar; Andersson, Tommy - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599527
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A theory of school choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595
A new mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others. We introduce a new framework for school-choice problems and two notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599548
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House allocation with overlapping agents: A dynamic mechanism design approach
Kurino, Morimitsu - 2009
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a newcomer in the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267121
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Two-sided matching via balanced exchange: Tuition and worker exchanges
Dur, Umut Mert; Ünver, M. Utku - 2015
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which each firm has to avoid being a net-exporter of workers. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440131