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Pruzhansky, Vitaly - 2004

This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payoffs as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325282

Psychology and economics rather than psychology versus economics: cultural differences but no barriers!

Brandstätter, Hermann; Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 2008

During the last three decades the ascent of behavioral economics clearly helped to bring down artificial disciplinary boundaries between psychology and economics. Noting that behavioral economics seems still under the spell of the rational choice tradition and, indirectly, of behaviorism we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266656

Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 1, pp. 89-122

unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact … probability players attach to (n- 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when …' confidence in mutual rationality persists at high orders, the discontinuity persists, but if confidence vanishes at high orders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215306

Ambiguous act equilibria

Bade, Sophie - 2010

A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the e ect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of 'independent strategies' as well as of 'common priors' are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270432

On Finding Curb Sets in Extensive Games

Pruzhansky, Vitaly - 2003

We characterize strategy sets that are closed under rational behavior (curb) in extensive games of perfect information and finite horizon. It is shown that any such game possesses only one minimal curb set, which necessarily includes all its subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Applications of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324747

Topologies on types

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen - 2006

We de.ne and analyze a strategic topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space, where two types are close if their strategic behavior is similar in all strategic situations. For a .xed game and action de.ne the distance be-tween a pair of types as the diþerence between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272319

Finding all minimal CURB sets

Klimm, Max; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2009

Sets closed under rational behavior were introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991) as subsets of the strategy space that contain all best replies to all strategy profiles in the set. We here consider a more restrictive notion of closure under rational behavior: a subset of the strategy space is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281178

Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

Asheim, Geir; Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2009

This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281186

Epistemically stable strategy sets

Asheim, Geir B.; Voorneveld, Max; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2010

This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285610

Trade, Trust And The Territoriality Of The Law

Schmidtchen, Dieter; Neunzig, Alexander R. - 1997

In this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296944

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