Showing 1 - 10 of 4,604
interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582516
is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272572
We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293065
The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325478
vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325509
The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496060
This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318959
We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is understood as the equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318958
We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318986
Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272596