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Karpov, Alexander - 2016

This paper surveys approaches to preference diversity measurement. Applying preference diversity axiomatics, a generalization of the Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2016) criterion, is developed. It is shown that all previously used indices violate this criterion. Two new indices (geometric mean based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011688276

Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms

Schmelzer, André - 2016

This paper experimentally studies an essential institutional feature of matching markets: Randomization of allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522113

Everyone Likes to Be Liked: Experimental Evidence from Matching Markets

Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … them. Through a pre-registered and theory-guided laboratory experiment, we provide evidence that such reciprocal … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467870

Mediated Contracts and Mechanism Design

Strausz, Roland - 2010

This note relates the mechanisms that are based on mediated contracts of Rahman and Obara (2010) to the mechanisms of Myerson (1982). It shows that the mechanisms in Myerson (1982) are more general in that they encompass the mechanisms based on mediated contracts. It establishes an equivalence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333821

Subsidies, Knapsack Auctions and Dantzig's Greedy Heuristic

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - 2009

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333849

Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly

Hu, Luke - 2012

This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, offer a financial reward to be paid to every short-listed bidders as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333722

Auctioning Process Innovations when Losers' Bids Determine Royalty Rates

Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2009

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms' bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing bid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333873

How to allocate Research (and other) Subsidies

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - 2011

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer's objective function,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334028

Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire

Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2010

This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334125

A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - 2010

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and money does not enter the procurer's objective function.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334157

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