We consider second-price and first-price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where a publicly announced reserve price has some influence on the reference point. It turns out...

Internet auctions, such as those on eBay, are known for multiple bidding and sniping. Buyers send bids in the closing seconds of an auction, knowing that bids arriving after the closure of the auction are not counted. They also bid several times at the same auction. We model Internet auction as...

The issues and challenges in taxation in the digital economy stem from the complex and multifaceted nature of the digital economy. Reaching a common understanding and measurement of its size and impact is critical in devising a tax regime for the digital economy. In APEC Secretariat (2019), the...

This paper reviews the different types of provisions explicitly addressing electronic commerce (e-commerce) in regional trade agreements (RTAs). The analysis covers the 275 RTAs currently in force and notified to the WTO as of May 2017. The analysis shows that e-commerce provisions have become...

The European Union (EU) has pursued an ambitious agenda for regulating the digital economy, and it is now planning to establish a new package of regulations, including the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the Digital Services Act (DSA), and a new regulation of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These...

In this paper, we will discuss how Europe makes digital policy and how its digital economic performance can be improved. The focus is on the D9+ initiative. Launched in 2016 on the initiative of former Swedish trade minister, Ann Linde, nine countries with a particular interest in matters of the...

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...

This paper studies the evolutionary stability of the unique Nash equilibrium of a first price sealed bid auction. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically stable under payoff monotonic dynamics for arbitrary initial popu- lations. In contrast, when the initial population...

The importance of auction theory has gained increased recognition in the scientific community, the latest recognition being the award of the Nobel price to Vickrey and Mirrlees. Auction theory has been used in quite different fields, both theoretically and empirically. This paper connects recent...