For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … reduces corruption. …

For our experiment on corruption we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs, and … behavior. The experimental results show that a higher degree of uncertainty in the informational setting reduces corruption. …

bribes and the firms paying bribes affect the equilibrium level of corruption in the sector. Bribe takers (utility employees …) are more likely to take bribes in countries with greater constraints on utility capacity, lower levels of competition in …Many recent studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural and institutional determinants of corruption at the …

and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and … corruption detection highly probable, we show that increasing policing or sanctions effectively deters crime. However, when … generate higher crime rates. In particular, the relationship between the traditional instruments of deterrence, namely …

The paper explores a game-theoreticmodel of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of …

The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues … that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially … depends on the possibility to monitor bureaucrat's behavior. The benefits of interjurisdictional competition only occur if …

We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem …'s bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the 'corruptibility' of bureaucrats in each case. Results …

The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues … that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially … depends on the effectiveness of monitoring bureaucrat's behavior. The benefits of interjurisdictional competition only occur …

This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as … the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the …, corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefs are initially low and are …