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Cooperative games: Core and shapley value
Serrano, Roberto - 2007
the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318970
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Game theory
Rosenmüller, Joachim; Trockel, Walter - 2001
Game Theory describes human interaction involving conflict, cooperation and competition, the term Interpersonal Decision Theory is synonymous. The term reflects the fact that most essential features of this field are manifested in parlor games. This topic-level treatment covers large parts of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272574
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A Coalition Game of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery
Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk - 2004
in Baltic Sea. The characteristic func-tion is constructed and the Shapley value and the nucleolus are used as one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321960
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Measuring synergy within a Triple Helix innovation system using game theory: cases of some developed and emerging countries
Mêgnigbêto, Eustache - In: Triple Helix 5 (2018) 1, pp. 1-22
with indicators like the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus. The core measures the extent of the synergy, the … Shapley value indicates an actor's strength to lead to and create synergy and the nucleolus determines an actor's strength to … their level of development. The study shows that state intervention in the economy influences the position of the core on a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011940124
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A review of cooperative rules and their associated algorithms for minimum-cost spanning tree problems
Bergantiños, Gustavo; Vidal-Puga, Juan J. - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 73-100
Minimum-cost spanning tree problems are well-known problems in the operations research literature. Some agents, located at different geographical places, want a service provided by a common supplier. Agents will be served through costly connections. Some part of the literature has focused,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496126
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Share Functions for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation
Alvarez-Mozos, Mikel; van den Brink, Rene; van der … - 2012
In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such games the player set is partitioned into unions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326205
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Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution
van den Brink, René - 2004
A situation in which a finite set of players can generate certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility. A solution for TU-games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of the payoffs that can be earned over the individual players. Two well-known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325253
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Games on Union Closed Systems
van den Brink, Rene; Katsev, Ilya; van der Laan, Gerard - 2011
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325691
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Computation of the Nucleolus for a Class of Disjunctive Games with a Permission Structure
van den Brink, René; Katsev, Ilya; van der Laan, Gerard - 2008
distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a … provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of the restricted games corresponding to a class of games with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325689
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An Algorithm for Computing the Nucleolus of Disjunctive Additive Games with An Acyclic Permission Structure
van den Brink, René; Katsev, Ilya; van der Laan, Gerard - 2008
distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a … computing the nucleolus of every restricted game corresponding to some disjunctive non-negative additive game with an acyclic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325798