Around the world (with the U.S. and U.K. as exceptions) concentrated ownership structures and controlling shareholders … are predominant even among listed firms. We provide novel empirical evidence how such controlling shareholders, in … family and non-family controlling shareholders and tensions within the founding family are important determinants of payout …

for the years 1997-2000. Our findings are that performance, measured by survey-based profit information, is increasing in … which managers could become entrenched, they already bear a large proportion of the costs and have therefore an incentive to …

to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal regime, managers will collude with large shareholders by means of … this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require share-holders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order … settlements or bribes that impose a negative externality on small shareholders. Contrary to conventional agency models, we find …

Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage …. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their … firms. We study the agency problem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his incentive compensation …

standards. Therefore, minority shareholders often use power to extract dividends. We also find that large and more profitable …

work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …