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How to construct alternatives: A computational voting model

Marengo, Luigi; Pasquali, Corrado - 2005

radically change the outcome of the majority voting process. In particular we show that any set of bundles (that we call choice …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328481

On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in a general class of social choice problems

Goeree, Jacob K.; Kushnir, Alexey - 2011

We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values. We provide a short and constructive proof that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316903

Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences

Peters, Hans; Roy, Souvik; Storcken, Ton - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 485-496

We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317111

The division problem with maximal capacity constraints

Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 29-57

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with singlepeaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. Most of the literature has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317137

Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity

Berglöf, Erik; Burkart, Mike; Friebel, Guido; … - 2009

In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity giving each member veto power. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogenous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320979

A Theory of Policy Reversal

Dur, Robert A.J.; Swank, Otto H. - 1997

After decades of government growth, Western countries have witnessed major policy reversals. Prominent examples include the far-reaching policy reversals implemented by Thatcher, Reagan, and Douglas. This paper offers an explanation for these policy reversals. Our key argument rests on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324722

Information and Strategic Voting

Tyszler, Marcelo; Schram, Arthur - 2011

voting, where voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment … experimental data. Our results indeed show that strategic voting arises, the extent of which depends on (i) the availability of … results show that information serves as a coordination device where strategic voting does not harm the plurality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325876

On the Measurement of Success and Satisfaction

van den Brink, René; Steffen, Frank - 2012

prevailing in the voting power literature. We demonstrate that both notions are conceptually distinct, and discuss their … canonical set-up of a simultaneous decision-making mechanism as it is predominant in the voting power literature. However, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326272

The Larger the Better? The Role of Interest-Group Size in Legislative Lobbying

Schneider, Maik T. - 2010

We develop a model of legislative lobbying where policy proposals are endogenous. We show that a policy proposer with preferences tilted towards one lobby may be induced by an increase in that interest group's size to propose policies geared towards the opposing lobby. Hence, a larger lobby size...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753190

Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach

Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel - 2010

Many voting rules and, in particular, the plurality rule and Condorcet-consistent voting rules satisfy the simple …-majoritarian voting rules that allow the decisiveness of the smallest majority larger than 1/2 and the classical Borda method of counts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336008