This paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex good and evaluate offers using … kinds of results. First, we characterize the set of equilibria in quasi-linear scoring auctions with multi-dimensional types …. In particular, we show that there exists a mapping between the class of equilibria in these scoring auctions and those in …

effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts …

This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …

We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …

the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience …Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector … competition, incentives in unit price auction change in such a way that can make bid skewing disappear. …

When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest …

first-price and second-price sealed bid auctions. The study is limited to two empirical specifications of bidders' signals …: Weibull and normal distribution. The optimal bid functions and the expected procurer's cost under both auction formats are … the two auction formats. Using estimates from structural estimation in previous empirical work on first-price auction data …

The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding … process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures … that on the procurement platform considered bidders indeed are aware of their rivals' characteristics and the buyers …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …

In a real-time electric power auction, the bids of producers consist of committed supply as a function of price. The …. I consider a uniform-price auction with a reservation price, where demand is inelastic and exceed the market capacity …