This paper studies optimal risk-taking and information disclosure by firms that obtain financing from both a 'relationship' bank and 'arm's-length' banks. We find that firm decisions are asymmetrically influenced by the degree of heterogeneity among banks: lowly-collateralized firms vary optimal...

Auch sechs Jahre nach Einführung der Vorschriften zur Ad-hoc-Publizität nach § 15 WpHG besteht bei den Unternehmen weiterhin große Unsicherheit bezüglich ihrer ordnungsmäßigen Umsetzung. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Behandlung von ad-hoc-meldepflichtigen Sachverhalten, die sich aus der...

Using a panel of survey-based annual investor relations (IR) rankings of European companies, we provide evidence suggesting that the marginal benefit of IR is greater in countries with capital markets that are less outside-shareholder oriented. For firms located in these countries, we find that...

The disclosure requirements for firms issuing equity on German crowdinvestingplatforms are quite lax at the moment. This paper states that this loose requirement policy is not optimal in the presence of competition among platforms. First, a simple three-staged theoretical model is derived to...

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...

The following paper is a theoretical introduction of the misinformation effect to behavioural finance. The misinformation effect causes a memory report regarding an event or particular knowledge to become contaminated with misleading information from another source. The paper aims to describe...

Global agierende Publikumsgesellschaften werden zunehmend mit dem spezifischen Verhalten einer kulturell diversen Investorenöffentlichkeit konfrontiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden in vorliegender Publikation entsprechende Hypothesen in Bezug auf ausgewählte kulturell bedingte Probleme an...

I consider an environment in which the entrepreneur generates information about the quality of the projects prior to contracting with the investor. The investor faces a moral hazard problem, since the entrepreneur may divert the funding for private consumption. When the investor bargains with...

This paper provides evidence that informed traders dominate the response of limit-order submissions to shocks in a pure limit-order market. In the market we study, informed traders are highly sensitive to spreads, volatility, momentum and depth. By contrast, uninformed traders are relatively...

We study the use of trading strategies and their profitability in experimental asset markets with asymmetrically informed traders. We find that insiders make most of their profits from trades which are initiated by their limit orders especially at the beginning of a period and when the change in...