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We study contracting when both principal and agent have to exert noncontractible effort for production to take place. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees to each party in spite of the surrounding uncertainty....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537015
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390710
African populations need better support through social protection mechanisms. Among those who need social security are millions of older people who, having worked all their lives in the formal sector, are in precarious situations with lower benefits. This study aims to appreciate theoretically,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011653978
I study a dynamic principal agent model in which the effort cost of the agent is unknown to the principal. The principal is ambiguity averse, and designs a contract which is robust to the worst case effort cost process. Ambiguity divides the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282917
-specific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for commitment and the demand for flexibility resulting from uncertainty about … with minimum-savings rules (another widely-studied form of commitment), and how budgeting depends on the intensity of self …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215309
This paper studies the effect of timing and commitment of verification in a principal-agent relationship with moral … the time of contracting. The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the importance of commitment by the principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014501886
We study a dynamic model of monopolistic provision of commitment devices to sophisticated, Strotzian decision makers …. We allow for unobservable heterogeneity at the contracting stage in the agents' preferences for commitment vs … of the induced balance between commitment and flexibility. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282919
This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple exit option contract, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299151
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325638
How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiation-proofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332130