agents in society. The implementation problem is then formulated: under what circumstances can one design a mechanism so that …. The theory of implementation or mechanism design formalizes this “social engineering” problem and provides answers to the … question just posed. I survey the theory of implementation in this article, emphasizing the results based on two behavioral …

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are … dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in … this mechanism design context, focusing instead on contractive mechanisms. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions …

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and … Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts …

between stability and (in)existence of multiple symmetric equilibria. While there is an equivalence between stability … relationship breaks down in higher dimensions. Stability under symmetric adjustments is a minimum requirement of a symmetric …

This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with … recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with …

. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to … interaction in different settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve. We find that applying the exogenous …

A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions …

equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching …