1999 and introduced subsequent to January 1 of that year, regarding the reform of the administrative division of Poland …

correlates with perceptions of corruption. We find judicial independence to be of major relevance for a tamed bureaucracy. …The monopoly position of the public bureaucracy in providing public services allows government employees to acquire … extent of rents in the public bureaucracy. The extent of rents is determined by differences in institutional constraints and …

The paper explores a game-theoreticmodel of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of …

The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues … that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially … data, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the …

We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an empirically relevant hold-up problem …'s bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the 'corruptibility' of bureaucrats in each case. Results …

The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues … that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially …-country data, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking different degrees of the freedom of the …

This paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration. Corruption is modeled as … the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat, a lobby, and the public. There is a moral cost of corruption for the …, corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefs are initially low and are …

This paper models corruption as optimal parasitism in organizations where teams of agents are weakly restrained by … principals. Each agent takes on part of the role of principal, choosing how much to invest in policing to repress corruption in … stressed in empirical analyses of corruption, and gives rise to a wide variety of equilibria. Allow income to co-evolve with …