This article is concerned with disequilibrium regime switching model to capture different regimes in the US gasoline … markets. The purpose is to illustrate potential regimes in gasoline market. Following a suggestion in Hunter and Tabaghdehi … (Cointegration and US regional gasoline prices: testing market efficiency from the stationarity of price proportions. Brunel …

Die starken Preissteigerungen für Benzin in den letzten 2 Jahren sind häufig auf mangelnden Wettbewerb zurückgeführt …

of gasoline. Relative to the previous literature, the distinguishing features of the present paper are: i) use of updated … and comparable data to carry out an international comparison of gasoline markets; ii) two-stage modeling of the … transmission of oil price shocks to gasoline prices (first refinery stage and second distribution stage), in order to assess …

We examine coordinated effects of mergers in the Swedish retail market for gasoline during the period 1986 …

withhold production. The results shows that compared to a Base Case, a gas cartel would reduce total supplied quantities and …

between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 8 out of 10 …

Retailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer group in their input … or rebates. The stability of such an implied cartel depends on the retailers' incentives to secretly source from a …

factor potentially leading to collusion. We show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce … mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with higher risk of collusion, when firms face indivisible costs of collusion …) firm benefits sufficiently more from collusion when industry asymmetries increase, collusion can become more likely when …

the firms are sued for cartel behavior and pay a fine. Tacit collusion is assumed to provide no grounds for the legal …The paper studies the role of communication in facilitating collusion. The situation of infinitely repeated Cournot … collusive output levels or a 'downward' demand shock. The firms choose between tacit collusion and collusion with communication …

is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market … cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion …