Showing 1 - 10 of 1,404
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333722
We present a new dynamic auction for procurement problems where payments are bounded by a hard budget constraint and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334157
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer's objective function,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334028
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms' bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing bid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333873
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334125
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316927
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer's objective function,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282909
In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimally structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does know that the principal knows them. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189081
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre-project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334134
The traditional approach to flexible retirement (e.g. NDC) neglects the impact of asymmetric information on actuarial fairness (neutrality). The mechanism design approach (e.g. Diamond, 2003) gives up the requirement of neutrality and looks for a redistributive second-best benefit-retirement-age...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261115