We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and … Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient allocation under the constraint that sellers are protected by …

effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for …We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable …-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts …

that might fail to deliver. The buyer conducts a procurement auction to determine contract suppliers and can choose between … auctions. Academic research on multi-sourcing procurement auction typically analyzes these auctions as stand-alone events. In …-maximizing suppliers who might fail to deliver. The buyer conducts a procurement auction to determine contract suppliers and can choose …

When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set …. We consider a stylized repeated procurement framework in which a buyer awards a contract over time to two firms with …

settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constrained optimal award … procedure: The procurer awards the contract via a price-only auction and cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences … price exceeds the initial price. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, i.e., under …

Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award … a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …

Auctions with endogenous rationing have been introduced to stimulate competition. Such (procurement) auctions reduce …

English auction restricts the information optimally. …

We empirically investigate the effect of procurement oversight on contract outcomes. In particular, we stress a …