either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure …We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and … stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense. …

) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or …This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …

schemes in order to influence the government's choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition … 'intuitive' hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global …

the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable … coalition tructures always exist, and provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of con- ractually Nash stable and weak … individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. …

the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable … coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak … individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. …

-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic … games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an … element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions …

the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two …

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector … players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is … stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the …

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that … the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation …

would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …