the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable … coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak … individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. …

the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable … coalition tructures always exist, and provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of con- ractually Nash stable and weak … individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games. …

We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and … either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure … stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense. …

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition … unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our … conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs the game of coalition formation. We show that if no …

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …

the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can … coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation … by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of …

models of coalition formation:• Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their … preference rankings until a majority coalition forms.• Build-Up (BU): Similar to FB, except that when nonmajority subcoalitions … convergence process.FB better reflects the unconstrained, or nonmyopic, possibilities of coalition formation, whereas BU …