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Aktienkursorientierte Management-Entlohnung: Ein Wettbewerbshemmnis im Boom?
Neubecker, Leslie - 2001
In the recent research on the effect of stock-based incentive compensation for managers on the degree of collusion … expectations of future demand change over time, managers with stock-based remuneration still have a greater incentive to collude … competition over time. If demand is stochastic, managers can set higher collusive prices in recessions. If demand follows a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305014
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Aktienkursorientierte Management-Entlohnung bei korrelierter Entwicklung der Marktnachfrage
Neubecker, Leslie - 2002
changes stochastically between a high and low growth rate, managers with undeferred stock-based remuneration set prices weakly … procyclically with positive and weakly anticyclically with negative correlation. Deferred compensation induces managers to collude …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305065
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Estimating the Cost of Executive Stock Options: Evidence from Switzerland
Drobetz, Wolfgang; Pensa, Pascal; Schmid, Markus M. - 2007
and growth opportunities, whereas the managers' pay-forperformance sensitivity remains largely unexplained. Firms with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390621
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Private information in executives' option trades: Evidence from the UK
Kyriacou, Kyriacos; Luintel, Kul B.; Mase, Bryan - 2008
UK executives' stock option exercises and associated sell decisions are motivated by private, inside, information. Executives use their inside information to lock in short-term gains, and to sell stock acquired prior to negative abnormal stock returns. This informed trading is robust to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322777
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How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf; Yu, Ko-Chia - 2009
This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326054
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CEO compensation, firm size and firm performance: Evidence from Finnish panel data
Mäkinen, Mikko - 2007
This paper examines how CEO pay is related to firm size and to firm performance in Finland by using new individual-level compensation data in 1996-2002. We find robust evidence that CEO average compensation has increased substantially between 1996 and 2002. For example, the ratio between CEO and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333064
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High powered Incentives and Fraudulent Behavior: Stock based versus Stock Option based Compensation
Andergassen, Rainer - 2005
In this paper shareholders face the trade-off between providing managers with incentives to exert beneficial effort and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011651436
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Risk Taking of Executives under Different Incentive Contracts: Experimental Evidence
Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand M. - 2011
Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to induce risk neutrality in otherwise risk averse agents. In an experiment, we find that subjects acting as executives do also take risks that are excessive from the perspective of shareholders if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427611
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Stock Options as Incentive Contract and Dividend Policy
Gillenkirch, Robert M.; Arnold, Markus C. - 2002
dividend protected, i.e. any dividend payout decreases the value of a manager’s options. Empirical evidence shows that this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316277
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How to Avoid Compensating CEO for Luck: The Case of Microeconomic Fluctuations
Oxelheim, Lars; Wihlborg, Clas; Zhang, Jianhua - 2010
Incentive effects of performance-based compensation schemes for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences on remuneration. These influences can be seen as reflecting luck from the CEO's perspective. In this chapter we present a model for how to avoid compensating CEO for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320333