We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...

This paper studies the possibility of implementing Pareto optimal outcomes in the combinatorial auction setting where bidders may have budget constraints. I show that when the setting involves a single good, or multiple goods but with single-minded bidders, there is a unique mechanism, called...

In recent years, Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCAs) have been used around the world to allocate frequency spectrum for mobile telecom licenses. CCAs are claimed to significantly reduce the scope for gaming or strategic bidding. In this paper, we show, however, that CCAs significantly enhance...

Germany was the first country in Europe that auctioned off spectrum in the valuable 700 MHz band for mobile telecommunication usage. The German regulator decided to auction off this spectrum together with spectrum in the 900 MHz and 1800 MHz legacy bands. With only the three incumbent operators...

Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom erhielten am 10. Dezember 2020 den Preis der Schwedischen Nationalbank für Wirtschaftswissenschaften zu Ehren von Alfred Nobel. Die Ökonomen erhielten den Preis für ihre Beiträge zur Auktionstheorie und für die Entwicklung neuer Auktionsformate.

Millions of citizens and firms lack access to high speed internet, even though governments pledged to spend huge sums of money to subsidize internet networks. In this paper we review some systematic flaws of present subsidy policies and outline a promising alternative. We propose that...

A general theoretical and empirical framework is developed for assessing the potential of a vertically integrated firm to foreclose downstream competitors. Using this framework a policymaker may also evaluate the empirical welfare effects from a vertically integrated firm raising rivals' costs....

This work is divided into two complementary parts. In the first part, we develop a partial equilibrium model, through which it is possible to analyze the influence of tariff modicity and the illegal occupation of poles on four agents: energy distributors, telecommunications operators, and energy...

We analyze a drastic price increase in the German auction market for reserve power, which did not appear to be driven by increased costs. Studying the market structure and individual bidding strategies, we find evidence for collusive behavior in an environment with repeated auctions, pivotal...

Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in a market are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information in these markets affects welfare and revenues is of fundamental interest. We introduce new mathematical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for...