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Biased Experts, Costly Lies, and Binary Decisions
Hodler, Roland; Loertscher, Simon; Rohner, Dominic - 2010
Decision makers lacking crucial specialist know-how often consult with better informed but biased experts. In our model …, and to situations with multiple experts and uncertainty about the size of the expert's bias. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430094
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Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Hahn, Volker - 2010
We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by … career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold … phenomenon, and the probability of the correct state of the world being revealed always converges to one as the group of experts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753200
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Imperfect Monitoring of Monitoring Agents: One Reason Why Hierarchies Can Be Superior to "Lean" Organizations
Kirstein, Roland - 2003
skill. The model draws on the theory of imperfect diagnosis and explains why hierarchies can be superior to 'lean … Überwachungsfähigkeit zu nutzen. Das Modell nutzt die Theorie imperfekter Diagnosen und erklärt, warum Hierarchien im Vergleich zu 'lean …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296886
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Anchoring the yield curve using survey expectations
Altavilla, Carlo; Giacomini, Raffaella; Ragusa, Giuseppe - 2014
The dynamic behaviour of the term structure of interest rates is difficult to replicate with models, and even models with a proven track record of empirical performance have underperformed since the early 2000s. On the other hand, survey expectations are accurate predictors of yields, but only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011605677
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Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation
Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer's problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444292
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Inflation Forecast Contracts
Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker - 2011
We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers’ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753213
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Price discrimination via the choice of distribution channels
Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - 2005
This article studies the use of different distribution channels as an instrument of price discrimination in credence goods markets. In credence goods markets, where consumers do not know which quality of the good or service they need, price discrimination proceeds along the dimension of quality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294597
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Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services - Theory and Experiment
Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Qiu, Jianying; … - 2010
experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294816
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Side-Effects of campaign finance reform
Dahm, Matthias; Porteiro, Nicolás - 2005
Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to 'buy favors', this paper assumes that contributions influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest groups...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266255
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Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
Dahm, Matthias; Porteiro, Nicolás - 2005
We examine the incentives of an interest group to provide verifiable policy-relevant information to a political decision-maker and to exert political pressure on her. We show that both lobbying instruments are interdependent. In our view information provision is a risky attempt to affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266260