Um gesellschaftlichen Wandel und neue Regulierungsformen von Arbeit adäquat zu beschreiben, ist es notwendig, der Frage nachzugehen, wie sich Regulierung von Arbeit konstituiert, in welchen Formen sie vorfindbar ist und welchen Dynamiken sie ausgesetzt ist. In diesem Arbeitspapier wird eine...

There is now ample evidence of a rise in ‘non-standard work arrangements’ in many industrialised economies, yet only rarely does theoretical and empirical work probe the question of why the risk of temporary employment varies. Focusing on temporary employment, the author extends the scope of...

The aim of this study is to evaluate employees' productivity in relation to their contract status. This study uses (a) survey data collected among manufacturing sector firms, having more than 15 employees, in Cameroon between April and May 2006 and (b) information issued by the National...

Dieses Arbeitspapier stellt die ersten zentralen empirischen Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts zu "Arbeitszeiten und Arbeitsformen in High-Tech-Unternehmen der "new economy" dar. Untersucht wurde am Beispiel der Arbeitszeit die Regulierung von hochqualifizierter Arbeit in Unternehmen der IT- und...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

Facing a stochastic market wage, which is independent of their own hiring policy, employers offer contracts specifying fixed wage, revenue share and employment duration. In ongoing employment relations it depends on the treatment whether fixed wages can be only increased or also decreased. Will...

Experimental studies have consistently shown that cooperative outcomes can emerge even in finitely repeated games. Such outcomes are justified by existing reputation building models, which suggest that cooperative outcomes can be sustained if some subjects have other-regarding preferences. While...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...