communication. Communication substantially increases bargaining efficiency among subjects who cooperated in the Prisoners' dilemma …In a laboratory experiment, we create relationships between pairs of anonymous subjects through a Prisoners' dilemma … game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values (sealed-bid double auction) bargaining game with or without …

We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort … a transfer depending on whether a player has a valid contract or not. We show that the different systems differ only … with respect to the contract length if the contract which maximizes the expected joint surplus of the initial club and the …

effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask … for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract …

effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask … for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract …

effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask … for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract …

This paper offers a contract-based theory to explain the determination of standard hours, overtime hours and overtime … premium pay. We expand on the wage contract literature that emphasises the role of firm-specific human capital and that … explores problems of contract efficiency in the face of information asymmetries between the firm and the worker. We first …

externalities. However, we show that the hold-up problem, which occurs if non-verifiable investments have external effects and … parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade through Coasean bargaining, may be solved by … government intervention. In this sense, the impossibility to rule out Coasean bargaining (after investments are sunk) may in fact …

We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the …

lenient and discriminate poorly between good performances. I show that this pattern is part of the optimal contract instead of … biased behavior. Furthermore, it is possible to implement the optimal contract in an ex-post budget-balanced way if … stochastic contracts are feasible. …