regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting regulation levels … lobbying, but that lobbying can reverse the welfare ordering. …

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a … restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both … firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect …

This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our … much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model … yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the …

reduce lobbying. However empirical evidence suggests that this is not always the case. This paper attempts to explain the … measure lobbying in two ways: (i) the number of lobbies formed under the two settings and, (ii) their impact on policy … offset their influence on policy; however it is possible that the threat of lobbying may affect policy even when no lobby …

are the opposite to those emerging from a model where only bribes are used. – lobbying ; threats ; quality of policymakers …

special interest groups. This paper examines the nature of the interaction between the lobbying activities of special interest … turn stimulates more intense lobbying which increases the scope of corrupt behavior. It is shown that electoral competition …

on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition. …

This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a … of the feasible policies.In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimalallocation of political … as the choicebetween two alternative legislative rules: open versus closed rule.We show that, in presence of lobbying …

). We show that standard theory in the economics of regulation must be reconsidered in a world with MNEs and novel results …