In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of the class of weighted division values. Firstly, while keeping efficiency, additivity and the nullifying player property from the original axiomatization of the equal division value, we consider relaxations of symmetry in line with Casajus (2019)...

Hamiache (2001) assigns to every TU game a so-called associated game and then shows that the Shapley value is characterized as the unique solution for TU games satisfying the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. The latter notion means that for every game the Shapley...

There is an extensive literature that studies situations of restricted cooperation in cooperative games. Myerson (1979) introduced communication graph games, where players can only cooperate if they are connected in an undirected graph representing the communication possibilities. The Myerson...

Given any alpha in [0,1], an alpha-constant-sum game on a finite set of players, N, is a function that assigns a real number to any coalition S (being a subset of the player set N), such that the sum of the worth of the coalition S and the worth of its complementary coalition N\S is alpha times...

Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose the class of alpha-Local Responsibility Sharing methods, which generalizes the Local Responsibility...

In view of the nature of pursuing profit, a selfish coefficient function is employed to describe the degrees of selfishness of players in different coalitions, which is the desired rate of return to the worth of coalitions. This function brings in the concept of individual expected reward to...

Standard solutions for TU-games assign to every TU-game a payoff vector. However, if there is uncertainty about the payoff allocation then we cannot just assign a specific payoff to every player. Therefore, in this paper we introduce interval solutions for TU-games which assign to every TU-game...

Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalize the permission structure. So, cooperative games on antimatroids group several well-known families of games which have important applications in economics and politics. Therefore, the...

Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning...

This paper aims to connect the social network literature on centrality measures with the economic literature on von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility functions using cooperative game theory. The social network literature studies various concepts of network centrality, such as degree,...