This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the...

This paper studies the incentive compatibility of solutions to generalized indivisible good allocation problems introduced by Sönmez (1999), which contain the well-known marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) and the housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) as special cases. In particular,...

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even...

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

A new mechanism was introduced in New York City and Boston to assign students to public schools. This mechanism was advocated for its superior fairness property, besides others. We introduce a new framework for school-choice problems and two notions of fairness in lottery design based on ex-ante...

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a newcomer in the beginning...

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which each firm has to avoid being a net-exporter of workers. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show...

In this paper we considered the classical Shapley-Scarf (1974) "house allocation model", where in addition there is a perfectly divisible good (money). The problem is to characterize all strategy-proof, nonbossy and individually rational allocation mechanisms. The finding is that only a...

A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and...