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, fairness, and implementation impossibilities. Despite that, we present two classes of mechanisms that maximize assignments. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011798971
preferences over refugees, but rather that priorities for refugees should be imposed, and that fairness beats efficiency in the … context of distributing asylum. The framework of matching theory is used to make the arguments precise, but the results are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852707
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011440131
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a … the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013464276
We propose a theory of skill mobility across cities. It predicts the well documented city size-wage premium: the wage distribution in large cities first-order stochastically dominates that in small cities. Yet, because this premium is reflected in higher house prices, this does not necessarily...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274949
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333849
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, offer a financial reward to be paid to every short-listed bidders as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333722
We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms' bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing bid...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333873
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a short-listed set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer's objective function,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334028
This paper reconsiders the licensing of a common value innovation to a downstream duopoly, assuming a dual licensing scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334125