We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes … condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability …. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense …

information is shared, externalities arise. The standard conditions for the two fundamental welfare theorems, thus, implicitly …

make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values—the values to the …

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs …

Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study …

Many consumers care about climate change and other externalities associated with their purchases. We analyze the …

encompasses many economic models with externalities and outside options. We show that when outside options are pure (i …

This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We … externalities. Since each buyer receives a positive payoff when the seller makes an agreement with some other buyer, positive … externalities induce a war of attrition between buyers. …

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identity-dependent externalities. A concept of conjectural … existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept to a matching-based Cournot model in which the unit production cost … technology and human capital are complementary, the positive assortative matching (PAM) is a stable matching under rational …

We introduce externalities into a two-sided, one-to-one assignment game by letting the values generated by pairs depend … that a stable outcome in an assignment game with externalities always exists if and only if all pairs are pessimistic …