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a disease (a discrimination risk). Differently, Consent Law allows them to hide this detrimental information, creating … exogenous values of adverse selection under Consent Law, and the repeated interactions experiment devised has not resulted in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435785
In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011995507
Given heterogeneity in incomes and health risks, with asymmetric information in the latter, preferences over the public-private mix in health insurance and care are derived. Results concerning crowding-out in the presence of adverse selection are established. For low-risk individuals,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010443330
changes are not accompanies by a tighter regulation, specifically in the form of improved risk adjustment formula. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322206
This paper analyses simultaneous regulation of cost and quality when firms have private, correlated information about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334894
discrimination risk. CL allows agents to withhold that information, generating adverse selection. We complement our model with an … experiment. We obtain that a larger fraction of agents test under CL than under DD, and that the proportion of individuals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657123
we run an experiment in order to shed light on both the take-up rate of genetic testing and on the comparison of …, exposing them to a discrimination risk. Consent law allows them to hide any detrimental information, resulting in adverse … selection. The experiment results in much lower genetic tests take-up rates with Disclosure Duty than with Consent Law, showing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012542449
Genetic insurance can deal with the negative effects of genetic testing on insurance coverage and income distribution when the insurer has access to information about test status. Hence, efficient testing is promoted. When information about prevention and test status is private, two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284415
A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design of insurance contracts. We analyze this issue within a model with the following important feature: A person’s well-being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284417
We study a health-insurance market where individuals are o.ered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is su.ciently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284290