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Nöldeke, Georg; Samuelson, Larry - 2015

We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390710

Decentralised Job Matching

Haeringer, Guillaume; Wooders, Myrna - 2003

This paper studies a decentralised job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325139

Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Klaus, Bettina - 2005

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272554

Agency theory meets matching theory

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, J. David - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-33

affect the optimal incentive contract. Finally, we discuss the effect of the existence of moral hazard on the nature of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496097

Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012

initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316921

Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333816

Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition

Bartling, Björn; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427633

Market Structure and Matching with Contracts

Westkamp, Alexander - 2010

contract with each other are jointly necessary and sufficient for (i) the equivalence of group and chain stability, (ii) the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270419

Observable Strategies, Commitments, and Contracts

Wärneryd, Karl - 2014

We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435790

Testing canonical tournament theory: On the impact of risk, social preferences and utility structure

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Wu, Steven Y. - 2012

We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282234