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Stabile Allokationen und Matching-Märkte: Zum Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften an Lloyd S. Shapley und Alvin E. Roth

Kübler, Dorothea - In: Wirtschaftsdienst 92 (2012) 12, pp. 843-847

The Nobel prize in economics in 2012 was awarded to Lloyd S. Shapley and Alvin E. Roth for 'the theory of stable … foundations of the theory of stable allocations (in particular the celebrated deferred-acceptance algorithm) as well as the …-sided matching markets, such as school choice, labour markets and kidney exchange, relies on both theory as well as on empirical …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010471332

Matching for Credit: Identifying information asymmetries in joint-liability lending

Klein, Thilo - 2024

-liability (JL) to individual liabil- ity (IL) lending models. This article tests a theory explaining this shift, focusing on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015211873

Non-standard choice in matching markets

Caspari, Gian; Khanna, Manshu - 2022

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013464276

Group identity and belief formation: A decomposition of political polarization

Bauer, Kevin; Chen, Yan; Hett, Florian; Kosfeld, Michael - 2023

How does group identity affect belief formation? To address this question, we conduct a series of online experiments with a representative sample of individuals in the US. Using the setting of the 2020 US presidential election, we find evidence of intergroup preference across three distinct...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014446331

Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets

Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023

Agents with reciprocal preferences prefer to be matched to a partner who also likes to collaborate with them. In this paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for mechanism design. Formally, the preferences of an agent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467722

Group Identity and Belief Formation: A Decomposition of Political Polarization

Bauer, Kevin; Chen, Yan; Hett, Florian; Kosfeld, Michael - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014469838

Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets

Coles, Peter; Shorrer, Ran - 2013

Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010313220

Transparent matching mechanisms

Möller, Markus - 2024

I study a central authority's ability to commit to a publicly announced mechanism in a one-to-one agent-object matching model. The authority announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then privately selects a mechanism to initiate a matching. An agent's observation in form of the final matching...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536335

The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions

Schlegel, Jan Christoph - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 801-839

Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks with frictions are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the existence of side-optimal equilibria, and a group-incentive-compatibility result hold with imperfectly transferable utility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536850

Dynamically stable matching

Doval, Laura - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 2, pp. 687-724

I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536854