We examine the prudential implications of the co-existence between the standardized approach and the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, as defined in the new Basle Accord. We consider a model in which sophisticated banks, eligible for the IRB approach, and unsophisticated banks, eligible for...

We analyze shareholders' incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer. This resistance is present even without any government...

The paper shows that mispriced deposit insurance and capital regulation were of second order importance in determining the capital structure of large U.S. and European banks during 1991 to 2004. Instead, standard cross-sectional determinants of non-financial firms’ leverage carry over to...

The Basel II Accord requires that banks and other Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs) communicate their daily risk forecasts to the appropriate monetary authorities at the beginning of each trading day, using one or more risk models to measure Value-at-Risk (VaR). The risk estimates of...

According to conventional wisdom, the Basel II Accord - a set of capital adequacy standards for international banks drawn up by a committee of G-10 supervisors - is essential if we are to avoid another financial crisis. This paper argues that this conclusion is false: Basel II is not the...