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Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with … preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467870
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the … (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325144
students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307931
students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286341
students often fail to grasp the strategic issues involved. The modified SDA algorithm significantly improves the matching for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281521
The paper considers a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. This set-up contains … two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307296
We show that a simple generalisation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325145
-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in … S under the second matching prefer each other to their respective room-mates in the first matching, then no room-mate of … an agent in S prefers the second matching to the first. This result is a strengthening of a result originally due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325151
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599445
-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599548