A monopolist is treated as a nexus of contracts with team production. It has one ownermanager. The owner-manager is the employer of two employees. A team production problem is present if the employer is a managerial lemon. If the team production problem is solved, the employer is a managerial...

A monopolist is treated as a nexus of contracts with team production. It has one ownermanager. The owner-manager is the employer of two employees. A team production problem is present if the employer is a managerial lemon. If the team production problem is solved, the employer is a managerial...

This paper theoretically analyzes the role of reference prices on competition and welfare in a context of a circular city model with free entry and reference prices, in which paying market prices above a reference negatively affects the utility of consumers. Agents interact in a three-stage...

There is some ambivalence with regards to how to improve strategic management of organizations. On the one hand the example of big companies emphasizes the need for formalization and good organization of strategic management process. On the other hand the example of small companies draws...

This paper reviews basic and emerging research trends on the moonshot phenomenon in the business world. It traces the emergence and development of the nuances for this construct, its relationships with the proclaimed corporate culture and some new attributes of management by objectives....

The traditional argument that shorter product cycles favor trade secret over patenting is reviewed. A game theoretic model provides an argument that shorter product cycles can induce firms to file more patent applications. The firms may be trapped in a prisoners' dilemma where all firms would...

This paper aims at establishing the existence of systematic differences in the nature of competitive strategies available to individual firms across industries. By means of qualitative content analysis, we extracted a matrix of 76 industries times 12 strategies reported as being characteristic...

This paper analyzes the efficiency of team production when agents exhibit other regarding preferences. It is shown that full efficiency can be sustained as an equilibrium through a budget-balancing mechanism that punishes some randomly chosen agents if output falls short of efficient level but...